Research

AoS: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Ethics, Feminist Philosophy
AoC: Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Media and Communication Theory


PUBLISHED/FORTHCOMING:

BOOKS
​
  • Under Contract. Reasons, Justification and Defeat (with Jessica Brown, eds.). Oxford University Press.
  • Manuscript. Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions. Current version here (comments much appreciated).
​
ARTICLES
​​Epistemology
  • Forthcoming. Testimonial Contractarianism, Nous. pdf
  • 2019. Knowledge-FIrst Functionalism. Philosophical Issues, A Supplement to Nous. Online First here. pdf
  • Forthcoming. The Social Epistemology of Education. Encyclopaedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy. Springer: Netherlands.
  • 2019. Epistemic Norms, Closure and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology (with J. Schnurr an E. Gordon). Synthese. Online First here. pdf
  • 2019. Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief-Assertion Parallel. Analysis, Volume 79, Issue 2. Online here.
  • 2019. Saying and Believing: The Norm Commonality Assumption. Philosophical Studies AVolume 176, Issue 8, pp 1951–1966. Online here
  • 2018. How to Be an Anti-Reductionist (with C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First here.
  • 2018. No Epistemic Norm for Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 55/3: 231-238. pdf
  • 2018. A Puzzle for Epistemic WAMs. Synthese. Online First. pdf
  • 2017. Commodious Knowledge (with C. Kelp). Synthese, vol 194/5: 1487-1502. pdf 
  • 2017. Hoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa (with C. Boult, F. Broncano-Berrocal, P. Dimmock, H. Ghijsen and C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First. pdf
  • 2017. Epistemic Norms and 'He Said/She Said' Reporting. Episteme, Volume 14, Issue 4, pp. 413-422. pdf
  • 2016. Knowledge, Rational Credibility and Assertion: The Scoreboard. Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Goals, ed. M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig. DeGruyter Berlin/Boston,  pdf.
  • 2016. The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge (with C. Kelp). American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53/4: 397-411. pdf
  • 2016. Norms of Belief (with C. Kelp and Harmen Ghijsen). Philosophical Issues, A Supplement to Nous. vol. 26/1: 375-392. pdf 
  • 2016. Perception, History and Benefit. Episteme, 13 (1), 61-76. pdf
  • 2016. Assertion: Knowledge is Enough. Synthese, 193(10), 3041-3056.  pdf  
​
 Philosophy of Language
  • 2019. The Constitutive Norm View of Assertion (with C. Kelp). In Goldberg, S. (ed), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.​ Online here.
  • 2019. Conceptual Innovation, Function First (with C. Kelp). Nous. Online First here.
  • 2019. Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms. Inquiry. Online First. pdf
  • 2018. Assertion: The Context Shiftiness Dilemma. Mind & Language, 34:503–517.Online here. pdf
  • 2018. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First here.
  • 2018. The 'Should' In Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry, vol 61/8. pdf
  • ​2016. Assertion: Just One Way to Take it Back. Logos & Episteme, vol. 7/3: 385-391. pdf​​
​

Ethics/Political Philosophy
  • Forthcoming. Moral Virtues with Epistemic Content (with C. Boult, C. Kelp and J. Schnurr). In Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
  • 2018. The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21(3), pp. 477-488 here. pdf
  • 2017. Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion (with C. Kelp). Journal of Philosophy, 114(2): 76-93. pdf​​
  • 2016. Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Rawlsian Veil. Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3), 557-572. pdf 
  • 2014. Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce's Style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11 (2): 107-121. pdf​​​​
​

Feminist Philosophy
  • Forthcoming. Hermeneutical Injustice as Basing Failure. In Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, Bondy, P. and Carter, A. (eds.). Routledge. pdf
  • Forthcoming. Gender and Group Disagreement (with E. Gordon and C. Kelp). In Group Disagreement, Carter, A. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (eds.), Routledge.
  • 2018. Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman.’ Logos and Episteme, Vol IX/1: 91-98. link pdf

IN PROGRESS:

​Invited
  • (Commissioned) Entry on ‘Trust’ (with J Adam Carter).  Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
  • Group Warrant (with J. Adam Carter and Christoph Kelp) (for a volume on Doxastic and Propositional Warrant for Routledge)
  • Mild Sceptical Invariantism (for a volume on Sceptical Invariantism for Routledge)
  • Assertion and Social Epistemology (with Chris Kelp, for the Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology)
  • Knowledge and Perceptual Entitlement (for Philosophical Issues)
  • Warrant Transmission and Psychological Defeat (for a volume on Epistemic Closure and Transmission)
  • Practical and Theoretical Reasoning (for a special issue of Synthese on 'Knowledge and Decision.'

Under Review
  • Assertion: A Function First Account (Book Manuscript, with C. Kelp, under review with Oxford University Press )
  • Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions (Book Manuscript, under review with Oxford University Press)
  • Reasons, Basing and Warrant
  • Blame as Performance
  • The Epistemic Improvement Account of Disagreement (with Fernando Broncano-Berrocal)

In preparation
  • Assertion: Foundational Issues. Volume co-edited with Herman Cappelen.
  • Shifty Speech (Book Manuscript)
  • Knowledge First Social Epistemology (Book Manuscript)
  • Disagreement, Knowledge First​
  • The ‘No Moral Enhancement’ View (with J. Adam Carter)​
  • Epistemic Encroachment (with Bob Beddor)
  • Duty to Believe

​