Research

AoS: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Ethics, Feminist Philosophy
AoC: Social and Political Philosophy, Social Ontology, Philosophy of Mind, Media and Communication Theory
PUBLISHED WORK
RESEARCH PROJECTS
BOOKS
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  • Under Contract. Reasons, Justification and Defeat (with Jessica Brown, eds.). Oxford University Press.​

JOURNAL SPECIAL ISSUES
  • 2020. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, BSET Special Issue (with R. Cowan, eds.) Online First here.
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ARTICLES
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​​Epistemology
  • Forthcoming. Testimonial Contractarianism, Nous. pdf
  • 2020. Social Epistemology of Education. Encyclopaedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy. Springer: Netherlands.
  • 2019. Knowledge-FIrst Functionalism. Philosophical Issues, A Supplement to Nous. Online First here. pdf
  • 2019. Epistemic Norms, Closure and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology (with J. Schnurr an E. Gordon). Synthese. Online First here. pdf
  • 2019. Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief-Assertion Parallel. Analysis, Volume 79, Issue 2. Online here.
  • 2019. Saying and Believing: The Norm Commonality Assumption. Philosophical Studies AVolume 176, Issue 8, pp 1951–1966. Online here
  • 2018. How to Be an Anti-Reductionist (with C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First here.
  • 2018. No Epistemic Norm for Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 55/3: 231-238. pdf
  • 2018. A Puzzle for Epistemic WAMs. Synthese. Online First. pdf
  • 2017. Commodious Knowledge (with C. Kelp). Synthese, vol 194/5: 1487-1502. pdf 
  • 2017. Hoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa (with C. Boult, F. Broncano-Berrocal, P. Dimmock, H. Ghijsen and C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First. pdf
  • 2017. Epistemic Norms and 'He Said/She Said' Reporting. Episteme, Volume 14, Issue 4, pp. 413-422. pdf
  • 2016. Knowledge, Rational Credibility and Assertion: The Scoreboard. Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Goals, ed. M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig. DeGruyter Berlin/Boston,  pdf.
  • 2016. The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge (with C. Kelp). American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53/4: 397-411. pdf
  • 2016. Norms of Belief (with C. Kelp and Harmen Ghijsen). Philosophical Issues, A Supplement to Nous. vol. 26/1: 375-392. pdf 
  • 2016. Perception, History and Benefit. Episteme, 13 (1), 61-76. pdf
  • 2016. Assertion: Knowledge is Enough. Synthese, 193(10), 3041-3056.  pdf  
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​ Philosophy of Language
  • 2019. The Constitutive Norm View of Assertion (with C. Kelp). In Goldberg, S. (ed), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.​ Online here.
  • 2019. Conceptual Innovation, Function First (with C. Kelp). Nous. Online First here.
  • 2019. Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms. Inquiry. Online First. pdf
  • 2018. Assertion: The Context Shiftiness Dilemma. Mind & Language, 34:503–517.Online here. pdf
  • 2018. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First here.
  • 2018. The 'Should' In Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry, vol 61/8. pdf
  • ​2016. Assertion: Just One Way to Take it Back. Logos & Episteme, vol. 7/3: 385-391. pdf​​
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Ethics/Political Philosophy
  • Forthcoming. Moral Virtues with Epistemic Content (with C. Boult, C. Kelp and J. Schnurr). In Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
  • 2020. Editorial. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, BSET Special Issue (with R. Cowan) Online First here.
  • 2018. The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21(3), pp. 477-488 here. pdf
  • 2017. Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion (with C. Kelp). Journal of Philosophy, 114(2): 76-93. pdf​​
  • 2016. Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Rawlsian Veil. Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3), 557-572. pdf 
  • 2014. Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce's Style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11 (2): 107-121. pdf​​​​
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Feminist Philosophy
  • Forthcoming. Hermeneutical Injustice as Basing Failure. In Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, Bondy, P. and Carter, A. (eds.). Routledge. pdf
  • Forthcoming. Gender, Race, and Group Disagreement (with M. Miragoli). In Group Disagreement, Carter, A. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (eds.), Routledge. pdf
  • 2018. Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman.’ Logos and Episteme, Vol IX/1: 91-98. link pdf
Upcoming:
 
Knowledge-First Social Epistemology
 2021 - 2026; 
Role: Principal Investigator
Details here
Knowledge first epistemology takes knowledge as central to epistemological affairs and ventures to analyse other epistemic standings in terms of knowledge. This project develops a knowledge-first framework for social epistemological issues.  
 

In Progress:

A Virtue Epistemology of Trust
2020-2023; Role: Co-Investigator (with J. Adam Carter (PI) and Chris Kelp (Co-I)
Funding: Leverhulme Research Grant (GBP 254.871)
Details here.
One of the most serious challenges faced by philosophers of trust is to understand why, and under what circumstances, we should trust as opposed to distrust others and what they tell us. Even though philosophical theories of trust have offered insights into what trust is, they have yet to tell us what qualities make someone a good or bad truster, and why. This project introduces virtue epistemology to address this issue for the first time. It offers a novel method for theorising about what dispositions trusting well requires, and it uses this method to explain why certain forms of skilled trusting are more valuable than others.
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Completed:

Epistemic Norms, A Function-First Account
October 2016 - February 2019;
Role: Principal Investigator.
Details here.
Funding: 
Mind Research Fellowship (~GBP 23,000)
The Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo Conference Funding (awarded, EUR 15,000)
JuMo Early Career Mobility Funding (EUR 14,500)

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Assertion: The Context Sensitivity Dilemma
October 2013 - December 2016; Role: Principal Investigator.
Details here.
Funding:
Doctoral Research Scholarship (awarded by KU Leuven, EUR 112,000).

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​WORK IN PROGRESS

Books
  • Manuscript Under Review. Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions. Current version here (comments much appreciated).
  • Manuscript Under Review. Shifty Speech and Independent Thought. Current version here (comments much appreciated)
  • Manuscript Under Review. Assertion: A Function First Account (with C. Kelp, current version here, comments much appreciated)

​Invited Articles
  • A Priori Perceptual Entitlement, Knowledge First (for Philosophical Issues 'Perceptual Evidence' issue, eds. Matt McGrath and Susanna Schellenberg)
  • A Priori Testimonial Entitlement, Knowledge First (for Episteme Special Issue)
  • (Commissioned) Entry on ‘Trust’ (with J Adam Carter).  Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
  • Group Belief and Warrant (with J. Adam Carter and Christoph Kelp) (for a volume on Doxastic and Propositional Warrant for Routledge, eds. Paul Silva and Luis Oliveira)
  • Classical Invariantism and Assertion Functionalism (for a volume on Sceptical Invariantism for Routledge, eds. Christos Kyriacou and Kevin Wallbridge)
  • Assertion and Social Epistemology (with Chris Kelp, for the Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, eds. Jennifer Lackey and Aidan McGlynn)
  • Warrant Transmission and Psychological Defeat (for a volume on Epistemic Closure and Transmission, eds. Matt Jope and Duncan Pritchard)
  • Knowledge and Reasoning (for a special issue of Synthese on 'Knowledge and Decision, eds. The Hamburg Knowledge and Decision Group).'


Articles Under Review
  • Reasons, Basing and Warrant
  • Blame as Performance
  • The Epistemic Improvement Account of Disagreement (with Fernando Broncano-Berrocal)

In preparation
  • Assertion: Foundational Issues. Volume co-edited with Herman Cappelen.
  • Knowledge First Social Epistemology (Book Manuscript)
  • Disagreement, Knowledge First​
  • The ‘No Moral Enhancement’ View (with Emma Gordon)​
  • Epistemic Encroachment (with Bob Beddor)
  • Duty to Believe
  • The Epistemic Normativity of Conjecture

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