Research

AoS: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Speech Act Theory, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophical Methodology, Ethics,
AoC: Social and Political Philosophy, Social Ontology, Philosophy of Mind, Media and Communication Theory
PUBLISHED WORK
RESEARCH PROJECTS
BOOKS
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  • Forthcoming. Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press. 
  • Forthcoming. Reasons, Justification, and Defeat (with Jessica Brown, eds.). Oxford University Press.​

JOURNAL SPECIAL ISSUES
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  • Forthcoming. Synthese Special Issue: Knowledge First Epistemology (with C. Kelp, eds.). 
  • 2020. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice BSET Special Issue: 'Ethics, Knowledge, and Language,' Vol 23/1 (with R. Cowan, eds.) Online  here.
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ARTICLES
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​​Epistemology
  • Forthcoming. A Social Epistemology of Assertion (with C. Kelp). Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.​
  • Forthcoming. A Priori Perceptual Entitlement, Knowledge First. Philosophical Issues, A Supplement to Nous: 'Perceptual Evidence' Issue, eds. Matt McGrath and Susanna Schellenberg.
  • Forthcoming. On Behalf of Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology (with J. Adam Carter and Christoph Kelp). Doxastic and Propositional Warrant, Paul Silva and Luis Oliveira (eds.), London: Routledge, 
  • Forthcoming. The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust (with J Adam Carter).  Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. pdf
  • 2020. Testimonial Contractarianism: A Knowledge-First Social Epistemology. Nous. Online First.  pdf
  • 2020. Social Epistemology of Education. Encyclopaedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy. Springer: Netherlands.
  • 2019. Knowledge-FIrst Functionalism. Philosophical Issues, A Supplement to Nous, Epistemology Issue, Lisa Miracchi (ed.) Online First here. pdf
  • 2019. Epistemic Norms, Closure and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology (with J. Schnurr an E. Gordon). Synthese. Online First here. pdf
  • 2019. Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief-Assertion Parallel. Analysis, Volume 79, Issue 2. Online here.
  • 2019. Saying and Believing: The Norm Commonality Assumption. Philosophical Studies Volume 176, Issue 8, pp 1951–1966. Online here
  • 2018. How to Be an Anti-Reductionist (with C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First here.
  • 2018. No Epistemic Norm for Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 55/3: 231-238. pdf
  • 2018. A Puzzle for Epistemic WAMs. Synthese. Online First. pdf
  • 2017. Commodious Knowledge (with C. Kelp). Synthese, vol 194/5: 1487-1502. pdf 
  • 2017. Hoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa (with C. Boult, F. Broncano-Berrocal, P. Dimmock, H. Ghijsen and C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First. pdf
  • 2017. Epistemic Norms and 'He Said/She Said' Reporting. Episteme, Volume 14, Issue 4, pp. 413-422. pdf
  • 2016. Knowledge, Rational Credibility and Assertion: The Scoreboard. Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Goals, ed. M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig. DeGruyter Berlin/Boston,  pdf.
  • 2016. The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge (with C. Kelp). American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53/4: 397-411. pdf
  • 2016. Norms of Belief (with C. Kelp and Harmen Ghijsen). Philosophical Issues, A Supplement to Nous: Epistemology and Mind Issue (Jack Lyons and Chris Kelp, eds.). vol. 26/1: 375-392. pdf 
  • 2016. Perception, History and Benefit. Episteme, 13 (1), 61-76. pdf
  • 2016. Assertion: Knowledge is Enough. Synthese, 193(10), 3041-3056.  pdf  
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​ Philosophy of Language
  • Forthcoming. Assertion Compatibilism. In Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered, Kyriacou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.), London: Routledge. 
  • 2020. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with C. Kelp). Synthese. 197: 125–137. Online First here.
  • 2019. The Constitutive Norm View of Assertion (with C. Kelp). In Goldberg, S. (ed), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.​ Online here.
  • 2019. Conceptual Innovation, Function First (with C. Kelp). Nous. Online First here.
  • 2019. Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms. Inquiry. Online First. pdf
  • 2018. Assertion: The Context Shiftiness Dilemma. Mind & Language, 34:503–517.Online here. pdf
  • 2018. The 'Should' In Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry, vol 61/8. pdf
  • ​2016. Assertion: Just One Way to Take it Back. Logos & Episteme, vol. 7/3: 385-391. pdf​​
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Ethics/Political Philosophy
  • 2020. Moral Virtues with Epistemic Content (with C. Boult, C. Kelp and J. Schnurr). In Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
  • 2020. Editorial. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice BSET Special Issue: Ethics, Knowledge, and Language, Vol. 23/1 (with R. Cowan) Online  here.
  • 2018. The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21(3), pp. 477-488 here. pdf
  • 2017. Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion (with C. Kelp). Journal of Philosophy, 114(2): 76-93. pdf​​
  • 2016. Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Rawlsian Veil. Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3), 557-572. pdf 
  • 2014. Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce's Style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11 (2): 107-121. pdf​​​​
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Feminist Philosophy
  • Forthcoming. Gender, Race, and Group Disagreement (with M. Miragoli). In Group Disagreement, Carter, A. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (eds.), Routledge. pdf
  • Forthcoming. Down Girl (Book review). Philosophical Quarterly. pdf
  • 2019. Hermeneutical Injustice as Basing Failure. In Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, Bondy, P. and Carter, A. (eds.). Routledge. pdf
  • 2018. Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman.’ Logos and Episteme, Vol IX/1: 91-98. link pdf
Upcoming:
 
Knowledge-First Social Epistemology
 2021 - 2026; 
Role: Principal Investigator
Details here
Knowledge first epistemology takes knowledge as central to epistemological affairs and ventures to analyse other epistemic standings in terms of knowledge. This project develops a knowledge-first framework for social epistemological issues.  
 

In Progress:

A Virtue Epistemology of Trust
2020-2023; Role: Co-Investigator (with J. Adam Carter (PI) and Chris Kelp (Co-I)
Funding: Leverhulme Research Grant (GBP 254.871)
Details here.
One of the most serious challenges faced by philosophers of trust is to understand why, and under what circumstances, we should trust as opposed to distrust others and what they tell us. Even though philosophical theories of trust have offered insights into what trust is, they have yet to tell us what qualities make someone a good or bad truster, and why. This project introduces virtue epistemology to address this issue for the first time. It offers a novel method for theorising about what dispositions trusting well requires, and it uses this method to explain why certain forms of skilled trusting are more valuable than others.
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Completed:

Epistemic Norms, A Function-First Account
October 2016 - February 2019;
Role: Principal Investigator.
Details here.
Funding: 
Mind Research Fellowship (~GBP 23,000)
The Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo Conference Funding (awarded, EUR 15,000)
JuMo Early Career Mobility Funding (EUR 14,500)

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Assertion: The Context Sensitivity Dilemma
October 2013 - December 2016; Role: Principal Investigator.
Details here.
Funding:
Doctoral Research Scholarship (awarded by KU Leuven, EUR 112,000).

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​WORK IN PROGRESS

Books
  • Manuscript Under Review. Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions​ pdf. (current version, comments much appreciated).
  • Manuscript Under Review. Giving Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of the Nature and Normativity of Assertion pdf (with C. Kelp, current version, comments much appreciated).

Invited
  • Justification and Knowledge: Which One First?. Contemporary  Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (eds. M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa), Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Function and Epistemic Normativity (with Chris Kelp). Blackwell Companion to Epistemology.
  • 'Being Rational and Being Right' by Juan Comesana (Book Review, for Mind)
  • Forthcoming. Warrant Transmission and Psychological Defeat. New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure, Jope, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.). London: Routledge.
  • Knowledge and Reasoning (for a special issue of Synthese on 'Knowledge and Decision, eds. The Hamburg Knowledge and Decision Group).​
  • A Priori Testimonial Entitlement, Knowledge First (for Episteme Special Issue)
  • No Epistemic Dilemmas. Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (eds. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup), Routledge.
  • Girl-Tech and Metalinguistic Negotiation. Feminism and Philosophy of Technology (eds. M. Edwards and S.O. Palermos).

Under Review
  • The Epistemic Normativity of Conjecture
  • Expressive Power and the Ethics of Meaning Production
  • Blame as Performance
  • The Epistemic Improvement Account of Disagreement (with Fernando Broncano-Berrocal)

In preparation
  • Knowledge First Social Epistemology (Book Manuscript)
  • Assertion: Foundational Issues. Volume co-edited with Herman Cappelen.
  • Trustworthiness as the Disposition to Fulfil One's Obligations (with Chris Kelp).
  • Disagreement, Knowledge First​
  • Knowledge First Group Functionalism
  • The ‘No Moral Enhancement’ View (with Emma Gordon)​
  • Epistemic Encroachment (with Bob Beddor)
  • Duty to Believe
  • Group Belief and Responsibility Transmission (with Chris Kelp)
  • Blameworthiness in Epistemology

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