Research

AoS: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Feminist Philosophy, Ethics.
AoC: Social and Political Philosophy, Social Ontology, Philosophical Methodology, Philosophy of Biology, Media and Communication Theory
PUBLISHED WORK
RESEARCH PROJECTS
BOOKS
​
  • Forthcoming. Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press. 
  • Forthcoming. Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press (with Chris Kelp).

EDITED VOLUMES

  • Forthcoming. Reasons, Justification, and Defeat (with Jessica Brown, eds.). Oxford University Press.​​

JOURNAL SPECIAL ISSUES
​
  • Forthcoming. Synthese Special Issue: Knowledge First Epistemology (with C. Kelp, eds.). 
  • Forthcoming. Philosophical Topics Special Issue: Epistemology (with A. Carter, C. Kelp, and J. Lyons, eds.)
  • 2020. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice BSET Special Issue: 'Ethics, Knowledge, and Language,' Vol 23/1 (with R. Cowan, eds.) Online  here.
​
JOURNAL ARTICLES

  • ​​Forthcoming. A Priori Perceptual Entitlement, Knowledge-First. Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous. Eds. M. McGrath and S. Schellenberg.
  • Forthcoming. Review of Juan Comesana, 'Being Rational and Being Right,' Oxford University Press 2020. Mind. 
  • 2020. Testimonial Contractarianism: A Knowledge-First Social Epistemology. Nous. Online First.
  • 2020. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with C. Kelp). Synthese 197: 125–137. 
  • 2020. Review of Kate Manne, Down Girl, Oxford University Press 2017. Philosophical Quarterly. Online First.
  • 2019. Knowledge-First Functionalism. Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous. Online First.
  • 2019. Conceptual Innovation, Function First (with C. Kelp). Nous. Online First.
  • 2019. Epistemic Norms, Closure and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology (with J. Schnurr an E. Gordon). Synthese. Online First
  • 2019. Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief-Assertion Parallel. Analysis, Volume 79, Issue 2.
  • 2019. Saying and Believing: The Norm Commonality Assumption. Philosophical Studies Volume 176, Issue 8:  1951–1966.
  • 2019. Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms. Inquiry. Online First.
  • 2019. Assertion: The Context Sensitivity Dilemma. Mind & Language. 34: 503–517
  • 2018. The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21(3), pp. 477-488
  • 2018. How to Be an Anti-Reductionist (with C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First
  • 2018. No Epistemic Norm for Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 55(3): 231-238
  • 2018. A Puzzle for Epistemic WAMs. Synthese. Online First.
  • 2018. Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman.’ Logos and Episteme, vol. 9(1): 91-98.
  • 2018. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with C, Kelp). Synthese. Online First.
  • 2017. The ‘Should’ in Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry, Vol. 61/8.
  • 2017. Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion (with C. Kelp). Journal of Philosophy, 114(2): 76-93.
  • 2017. Commodious Knowledge (with C. Kelp). Synthese, vol 194(5): 1487-1502.
  • 2017. Epistemic Norms and He Said/She Said Reporting. Episteme, 14(4): 413-422.
  • 2017. Hoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa (with C. Boult, F. Broncano-Berrocal, P. Dimmock, H. Ghijsen and C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First.
  • 2016. Assertion: Knowledge is Enough. Synthese, 193(10): 3041-3056.
  • 2016. Norms of Belief (with C. Kelp and H. Ghijsen). Philosophical Issues, vol. 26(1): 375-392.
  • 2016. The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge (with C. Kelp). American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53(4): 397-411.
  • 2016. Perception, History and Benefit. Episteme, 13(1): 61-76.
  • 2016. Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Rawlsian Veil.  Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3): 557-572.
  • 2016. Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back. Logos & Episteme, vol. 7(3): 385-391.
  • 2014. Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce's Style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11(2): 107-121
 
 BOOK CHAPTERS

  • Forthcoming. Justification and Knowledge: Which One First?. Contemporary  Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (eds. M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa), Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Forthcoming. Function and Epistemic Normativity (with C. Kelp). Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Forthcoming. A Social Epistemology of Assertion (with C. Kelp). Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, Lackey J. and McGlynn A. (Eds.). Oxford University Press. pdf
  • Forthcoming. Assertion Compatibilism. In Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered, C. Kyriakou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.), Routledge. pdf
  • Forthcoming. No Epistemic Dilemmas. Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (eds. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup), Routledge.
  • Forthcoming. On Behalf of Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology (with A. Carter and C. Kelp). Doxastic and Propositional Warrant, Paul Silva and Luis Oliveira (eds.), London: Routledge. pdf
  • Forthcoming. Warrant Transmission and Psychological Defeat. In Epistemic Closure and Transmission, Eds.: Jope M. and Pritchard, D. Routledge.
  • Forthcoming. Gender, Race, and Group Disagreement (with M. Miragoli). In Group Disagreement, Carter, A and Broncano-Berrocal, F., Routledge.
  • 2020. The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust. (with A. Carter). Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
  • 2020. Social Epistemology of Education. Encyclopaedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy. Springer: Netherlands.
  • 2020. Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content (with C. Boult, C. Kelp and J. Schnurr). In Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
  • 2019. Hermeneutical Injustice as Basing Failure. In Bondy, P. and Carter, J.A. (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, Routledge.
  • 2018. The Constitutive Norm View of Assertion (with C. Kelp). In Goldberg, S. (ed), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
  • 2016. Knowledge, Rational Credibility, and Assertion: The Scoreboard. In Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Goals, DeGruyter Berlin/Boston.​
Upcoming:
 
Knowledge-First Social Epistemology
 2021 - 2026; 
Role: Principal Investigator
Details here
Knowledge first epistemology takes knowledge as central to epistemological affairs and ventures to analyse other epistemic standings in terms of knowledge. This project develops a knowledge-first framework for social epistemological issues.  
 

In Progress:

A Virtue Epistemology of Trust
2020-2023; Role: Co-Investigator (with J. Adam Carter (PI) and Chris Kelp (Co-I)
Funding: Leverhulme Research Grant (GBP 254.871)
Details here.
One of the most serious challenges faced by philosophers of trust is to understand why, and under what circumstances, we should trust as opposed to distrust others and what they tell us. Even though philosophical theories of trust have offered insights into what trust is, they have yet to tell us what qualities make someone a good or bad truster, and why. This project introduces virtue epistemology to address this issue for the first time. It offers a novel method for theorising about what dispositions trusting well requires, and it uses this method to explain why certain forms of skilled trusting are more valuable than others.
​

Completed:

Epistemic Norms, A Function-First Account
October 2016 - February 2019;
Role: Principal Investigator.
Details here.
Funding: 
Mind Research Fellowship (~GBP 23,000)
The Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo Conference Funding (awarded, EUR 15,000)
JuMo Early Career Mobility Funding (EUR 14,500)

​
Assertion: The Context Sensitivity Dilemma
October 2013 - December 2016; Role: Principal Investigator.
Details here.
Funding:
Doctoral Research Scholarship (awarded by KU Leuven, EUR 112,000).

​

​WORK IN PROGRESS

Books
  • Manuscript Under Review. Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions​ pdf. (current version, comments much appreciated).

Invited​
  • Knowledge and Reasoning (for a special issue of Synthese on 'Knowledge and Decision, eds. The Hamburg Knowledge and Decision Group).​
  • A Priori Testimonial Entitlement, Knowledge First (for Episteme Special Issue)
  • Girl-Tech and Metalinguistic Negotiation. Feminism and Philosophy of Technology (eds. M. Edwards and S.O. Palermos).

Under Review
  • The Epistemic Normativity of Conjecture
  • Expressive Power and the Ethics of Meaning Production
  • Blame as Performance
  • The Epistemic Improvement Account of Disagreement (with F. Broncano-Berrocal)

In preparation
  • Knowledge First Social Epistemology (Book Manuscript)
  • Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe
  • She's a She: Sexual Justice Through Linguistic Innovation for Gender Terms (with C. Kelp)
  • What is Trustworthiness? (with C. Kelp) pdf
  • Proper Suspension
  • Evidential Equality and Testimonial Justice
  • Speech Acts in Context. Volume co-edited with Herman Cappelen.
  • Epistemic Encroachment (with Bob Beddor)
  • Group Belief and Responsibility Transmission (with C. Kelp)
  • Blameworthiness in Epistemology
  • Basing as Following Indicators
  • Reasons to Believe as Knowledge Indicators

​