Publications

Monograph developing an integrated, knowledge-based account of the normativity of constative speech, in conjunction with classical invariantism about knowledge attributions.

Monograph investigating the relation between knowledge sharing and assertion, and developing a functionalist account of what it is to assert well.

The first volume to explore the topic of defeat in all its facets. Brings together work in epistemology, ethics, and practical reasoning.

AoS: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Moral & Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Gender and Race, Philosophy of AI
AoC: Philosophical Methodology, Social Ontology, Philosophy of Science, Applied Ethics, Media and Communication

Theory.

BOOKS

In Progress. Resistance to Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
2021. Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press (with Chris Kelp).
2021. Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press.

See here for an interview with me about the book by Carrie Figdor

for the New Books in Philosophy podcast:

See here for Philosopher Meets Critics session at Concept Cologne:

(with Peter J. Graham, Robin McKenna, and Nuno Venturinha)

EDITED VOLUMES

2021. Reasons, Justification, and Defeat (with Jessica Brown, eds.). Oxford University Press.

JOURNAL SPECIAL ISSUES

Forthcoming. Synthese Special Issue: Knowledge First Epistemology (with C. Kelp, eds.).
2022. Philosophical Studies Book Symposium on Jessica Brown's 'Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge' (with A. Carter and C. Kelp).
2021. Philosophical Topics Special Issue: Epistemology (with A. Carter, C. Kelp, and J. Lyons, eds.)
2020. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice BSET Special Issue: 'Ethics, Knowledge, and Language,' Vol 23/1 (with R. Cowan, eds.) Online here.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Forthcoming. What is Trustworthiness? (with C. Kelp). Nous.
Forthcoming. Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2021

In the news here and here.

Forthcoming. Knowledge and Disinformation. Episteme, Special Issue.
Forthcoming. Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (with C. Kelp). Asian Journal of Philosophy, central piece in an invited article symposium, ed. N. Pedersen, critics: J Adam Carter, Fei Song, Shane Ryan.
2022. The Epistemic Normativity of Conjecture. Philosophical Studies 179: 3447–3471.
2022. How to Be an Infallibilist (with C. Kelp and J.A. Carter). Philosophical Studies 179(8): 2675-2682.
2021. Disagreement and Epistemic Improvement. (with F. Broncano-Berrocal). Synthese. 199:14641–14665.
2021. Knowledge and Reasoning. Synthese. 199: 10371–10388
2021. Blame as Performance. Synthese 199: 7595–7614.
2021. Testimonial Contractarianism: A Knowledge-First Social Epistemology. Nous 55/4: 891-916.

Top 10 most downloaded papers in Nous (for 2019 and 2020).

2020. A Priori Perceptual Entitlement, Knowledge-First. Philosophical Issues. Eds. M. McGrath and S. Schellenberg.
2020. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with C. Kelp). Synthese 197: 125–137.
2020. Conceptual Innovation, Function First (with C. Kelp). Nous. 54/4: 985-1002.
2020. Editorial (with R. Cowan). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Special Issue 'Ethics, Knowledge, and Language' Vol 23/1: 1-3.
2020. Hoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa (with C. Boult, F. Broncano-Berrocal, P. Dimmock, H. Ghijsen and C. Kelp). Synthese. 197: 5187–5202.
2019. Knowledge-First Functionalism. Philosophical Issues. Ed: Lisa Miracchi. Online First.
2019. Epistemic Norms, Closure and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology (with J. Schnurr an E. Gordon). Synthese. Online First
2019. Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief-Assertion Parallel. Analysis, Volume 79, Issue 2.
2019. Saying and Believing: The Norm Commonality Assumption. Philosophical Studies Volume 176, Issue 8: 1951–1966.
2019. Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms. Inquiry. Online First.
2019. Assertion: The Context Shiftiness Dilemma. Mind & Language. 34: 503–517
2018. The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21(3), pp. 477-488
2018. How to Be an Anti-Reductionist (with C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First
2018. No Epistemic Norm for Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 55(3): 231-238
2018. A Puzzle for Epistemic WAMs. Synthese. Online First.
2018. Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’. Logos and Episteme, vol. 9(1): 91-98.
2018. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with C, Kelp). Synthese. Online First.
2017. The ‘Should’ in Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry, Vol. 61/8.
2017. Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion (with C. Kelp). Journal of Philosophy, 114(2): 76-93.
2017. Commodious Knowledge (with C. Kelp). Synthese, vol 194(5): 1487-1502.
2017. Epistemic Norms and He Said/She Said Reporting. Episteme, 14(4): 413-422.
2016. Assertion: Knowledge is Enough. Synthese, 193(10): 3041-3056.
2016. Norms of Belief (with C. Kelp and H. Ghijsen). Philosophical Issues, eds. C. Kelp and J. Lyons, vol. 26(1): 375-392.
2016. The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge (with C. Kelp). American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53(4): 397-411.
2016. Perception, History and Benefit. Episteme, 13(1): 61-76.
2016. Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Rawlsian Veil. Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3): 557-572.
2016. Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back. Logos & Episteme, vol. 7(3): 385-391. Reply from Jon Kvanvig here.
2014. Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce's Style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11(2): 107-121.

BOOK CHAPTERS

Forthcoming. Knowledge Comes First. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (eds. B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa), Wiley-Blackwell.
Forthcoming. Knowledge Still Comes First. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (eds. B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa), Wiley-Blackwell.
Forthcoming. Defeat. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, ed. Kurt Sylvan, Wiley-Blackwell.
Forthcoming. Epistemology. The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy (ed. M. Rossberg).
Forthcoming. Talking to Social Robots, Trusting Diagnostic AI: Explainability vs. Trustworthiness. Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives, (Cappelen, H. and Sterken, R), Oxford University Press.
Forthcoming. Two Dilemmas for Value-Sensitive Technological Design. In Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies, Eds. Edwards, M. and Palermos, O., Routledge.
Forthcoming. Engineering Evidence. New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering (eds. M.G. Isaac and K. Scharp), Springer.
Forthcoming. A Social Epistemology of Assertion (with C. Kelp). Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, Lackey J. and McGlynn A. (Eds.). Oxford University Press.
Forthcoming. Conceptual Engineering. Carnap Handbuch, ed. Christian Damböck and Georg Schiemer, Metzler Verlag.
Forthcoming. Knowledge and Disagreement (with F. Broncano-Berrocal). Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, (M. Baghramian, A. Carder, and R. Rowland eds.), Routledge.
2021. Assertion Compatibilism. In Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered, C. Kyriakou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.), Routledge. pdf
2021. Scepticism about Epistemic Dilemmas. Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (eds. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup), Routledge.
Forthcoming. On Behalf of Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology (with A. Carter and C. Kelp). Doxastic and Propositional Warrant, Paul Silva and Luis Oliveira (eds.), London: Routledge. pdf
Forthcoming. Closure, Warrant Transmission, and Defeat. In Epistemic Closure and Transmission, Eds.: Jope M. and Pritchard, D. Routledge.
2021. Gender, Race, and Group Disagreement (with M. Miragoli). In Group Disagreement, Carter, A and Broncano-Berrocal, F., Routledge.
2021. Introduction (with J. Brown). Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2020. The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust. (with A. Carter). Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
2020. Social Epistemology of Education. Encyclopaedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy. Springer: Netherlands.
2020. Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content (with C. Boult, C. Kelp and J. Schnurr). In Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
2019. Hermeneutical Injustice as Basing Failure. In Bondy, P. and Carter, J.A. (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, Routledge.
2018. Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View (with C. Kelp). In Goldberg, S. (ed), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
2016. Knowledge, Rational Credibility, and Assertion: The Scoreboard. In Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Goals, DeGruyter Berlin/Boston.

BOOK REVIEWS & SYMPOSIA CONTRIBUTIONS

Forthcoming. Review of Jennifer Lackey, The Epistemology of Groups, Oxford University Press 2021. Philosophical Review.
Forthcoming. Sosa on Permissible Suspension. Contribution to Book Symposium on Ernest Sosa's 'Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of TElic Normativity', Res Philosophica.
Forthcoming. Tanesini on Truth and Epistemic Vice. Contribution to Book Symposium on Alessandra Tanesini's 'The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology', Inquiry.
2022. Review of Sven Rosenkranz. Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford University Press 2021. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
2021. Review of Juan Comesana, Being Rational and Being Right, Oxford University Press 2020. Mind. Online First.
2020. Review of Sandy Goldberg, Conversational Pressure, Oxford University Press 2020. Philosophical Quarterly. Online First.
2020. Review of Kate Manne, Down Girl, Oxford University Press 2017. Philosophical Quarterly. Online First.