Publications

AoS: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Moral & Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Gender and Race, Philosophy of AI, Philosophy of Information, Philosophical Methodology.
AoC: Applied Ethics, Philosophy of Psychology and Neuroscience, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Social Science, Social Ontology, Philosophy of Biology, Media Studies, Communication Science

BOOKS

Forthcoming. Knowledge and Artificial Intelligence (with Chris Kelp). Cambridge University Press.

2026. Knowledge and Conceptual Engineering: The Epistemology, Ethics, and Politics of Meaning Production (with Chris Kelp). Oxford University Press.

2025. Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Defence. Cambridge Elements Series, Cambridge University Press.

2024. Resistance to Evidence. Cambridge University Press.

See here for Carolina Flores's review of Resistance to Evidence for MInd

See here for Cat Saint-Croix's review of Resistance to Evidence for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

See here for a Philosopher Meets Critics book symposium on Resistance to Evidence at Concept Cologne (with Julia Staffel,

Juan Comesana, and Matt McGrath

See here for an interview with me about Resistance to Evidence for the Friction Philosophy podcast

See here for an interview with me about Resistance to Evidence for the New Books Network podcast

See here for my Annual Center Lecture on Resistance to Evidence at the UC Irvine Center for Knowledge, Technology, and

Society

See here for my public lecture on Resistance to Evidence at the Festival of Ideas in Madrid

See here for a talk of mine on Resistance to Evidence, part of the 'Why Do People Believe Weird Things' Series at Bochum

University

See here for a talk of mine on Resistance to Evidence as part of the Young Academy of Europe 10th Anniversary Lecture

Series

2021. Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion (with Chris Kelp). Cambridge University Press.

See here for John Greco's review of Sharing Knowledge for Phil Review

See here for Jonathan Jenkins-Ichikawa's review of Sharing Knowledge for Analysis

See here for Tammo Lossau's review of Sharing Knowledge for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy

2021. Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press.

See here for Dorit Ganson's review of Shifty Speech and Independent Thought for Phil Review

See here for Robin McKenna's review of Shifty Speech and Independent Thought for Inquiry

See here for an interview with me about Shifty Speech by Carrie Figdor for the New Books in Philosophy podcast See here for Philosopher Meets Critics session at Concept Cologne (with P. J. Graham, R. McKenna, and N. Venturinha)

EDITED VOLUMES

2021. Reasons, Justification, and Defeat (with Jessica Brown, eds.). Oxford University Press.

EDITED JOURNAL SPECIAL ISSUES

2025. Philosophical Quarterly Special Issue: New Work in Epistemic Injustice

2023. Synthese Special Issue: Knowledge First Epistemology (with Chris Kelp).

2022. Philosophical Studies Book Symposium on Jessica Brown's 'Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge' (with Adam Carter and Chris Kelp).

2021. Philosophical Topics Special Issue: Epistemology (with Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, Chris Kelp, and Jack Lyons)

2020. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice BSET Special Issue: 'Ethics, Knowledge, and Language,' Vol 23/1 (with Robert Cowan)

JOURNAL ARTICLES & BOOK CHAPTERS

Forthcoming. Epistemology. The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy (ed. M. Rossberg). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Forthcoming. Knowledge and Epistemic Agency. Criminal Law and Philosophy, Special Issue on Jennifer Lackey's Criminal Epistemic Injustice.

Forthcoming. Trusting AI: Explainability vs. Trustworthiness (with Chris Willard-Kyle). Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives, (eds. Herman Cappelen and Rachel Sterken), Oxford University Press.

Forthcoming. Normative ‘Oomph’ and Functional Epistemic Oughts (with C. Kelp). In Ichikawa, J. (ed) Positive Epistemology. Routledge.

Forthcoming. Overfitting or Extensional Adequacy? The Case of Morally Pregnant Cases in Epistemology (with Harmen Ghijsen). In Equilibrism in Metaphilosophy (László Kocsis and János Tőzsér, eds.), Routledge.

Forthcoming. Information, Misinformation, Disinformation: A Unified Conceptual Framework (with Chris Kelp). Mis/Disinformation and Other Epistemic Pathologies (ed. Mihaela Popa-Wyatt), Cambridge University Press.

Forthcoming. Conceptual Engineering. Carnap Handbuch, ed. Christian Damböck and Georg Schiemer, Metzler Verlag.

2025. Defeat. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, eds. Kurt Sylvan, Matthias Steup, Ernie Sosa, Wiley-Blackwell.

2025. What is Information? (with Chris Kelp). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 99/1: 189–208

2025. The Infodemic, Epistemic Exclusion in Science Communication, and Distrust in Scientific Expertise (with J. Adekola). The Epistemology of Experts (eds. Thomas Grundmann, Anna-Maria Eder and Peter Brössel). Routledge.

2025. Naturalised Epistemic Oughts. Kornblith and His Critics (eds. Josh DiPaolo, J. and Luis RG Oliveira). Wiley Blackwell

2025. Engineering Evidence. New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering (eds. Manuel G. Isaac and Kevin Scharp), Springer.

2025. A Social Epistemology of Assertion (with C. Kelp). Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology (eds. Jennifer Lackey and Aidan McGlynn. Oxford University Press.

2025. Inquiry, Doubt, and Normative Defeat (with C. Kelp and L. Mace). In Matheson, J. and Creller, A (eds.), Inquiry: Philosophical Perspectives, Routledge.

2025. Epistemic Oughts of Attention. Knowledge and Rationality: Essays in Honor of Stewart Cohen (eds. Matt McGrath and Juan Comesana). Routledge.

2025. McKenna on Non-Ideal Epistemology. Critical note on Robin McKenna's 'Non-Ideal Epistemology' (OUP 2023), International Journal of Philosophical Studies.

2024. What Is Reasonable Doubt? (with Lilith Mace). Philosophical Studies, Special Issue on Ernie Sosa's Epistemic Explanations, eds. J. Greco and O. Bueno. Online First.

2024. Politically Motivated Reasoning, Disinformation, and Knowledge Resistance. European Review. Special Issue Academia Europaea Conference 2023. Online First.

2024. Trustworthy AI: responses to commentators (with Chris Kelp). Asian Journal of Philosophy; part of an invited article symposium, ed. N. Pedersen, critics: J Adam Carter, Fei Song, Shane Ryan. Online First.

2024. Aesthetic Testimony, Aesthetic Disagreement, and Defeat (with Chris Kelp). For Epistemology of Conversation (Silva Filho, W. ed.), Springer.

2024. Knowledge and Disagreement (with F. Broncano-Berrocal). Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, (eds. Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carder, and Richard Rowland eds.), Routledge.

2024. Knowledge Comes First. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (eds. Blake Roeber, Matthias Steup, John Turri and Ernest Sosa), Wiley-Blackwell.

2024. Knowledge Still Comes First. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (eds. Blake Roeber, Matthias Steup, John Turri and Ernest Sosa), Wiley-Blackwell.

2023. What is Trustworthiness? (with Chris Kelp). Nous, Vol. 57, Issue3: p 667-683.

Top 10 most cited papers in Nous for 2022 and 2023

2023. Knowledge and Disinformation. Episteme, Special Issue Episteme Conference 2022. Online First.

2023. Linguistic Innovation for Gender Terms (with Chris Kelp). Inquiry. Online First.

2023. Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Online First.

Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2021, in the news here and here.

Top 10 most cited papers in PPR for 2023.

See this MPhi blogpost by Richard Pettigrew for a formal approach to my theory of evidence resistance

2023. Trust, Trustworthiness, and Obligation (with Chris Willard-Kyle). Philosophical Psychology Special Issue 'Trustworthiness: Iindividual and Institutional Dimensions, eds. E. Lalumera and F. Ferrari. Online First.

2023. Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (with Chris Kelp). Asian Journal of Philosophy, central piece in an invited article symposium, ed. N. Pedersen, critics: J Adam Carter, Fei Song, Shane Ryan.Online First.

2023. Two Dilemmas for Value-Sensitive Technological Design. In Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies, Eds. Mary Edwards and Orestis Palermos, Routledge.

2023. Tanesini on Truth and Epistemic Vice. Contribution to Book Symposium on Alessandra Tanesini's 'The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology', Inquiry. Online First.

2022. The Epistemic Normativity of Conjecture. Philosophical Studies 179: 3447–3471.

2022. How to Be an Infallibilist (with Chris Kelp and Adam Carter). Philosophical Studies, Book Symposium Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, 179(8): 2675-2682.

2022. On Behalf of Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology (with A. Carter and C. Kelp). Doxastic and Propositional Warrant, Paul Silva and Luis Oliveira (eds.), London: Routledge.

2022. Closure, Warrant Transmission, and Defeat. In New Perspectives on Epistemic Closur, Eds.: Jope M. and Pritchard, D. Routledge.

2022. Review of Jennifer Lackey, The Epistemology of Groups, Oxford University Press 2021. Philosophical Review, 131 (4): 537–541.

2022. Sosa on Permissible Suspension. Contribution to Book Symposium on Ernest Sosa's 'Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity', Res Philosophica, 99 (4):453-466.

2022. Review of Sven Rosenkranz. Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford University Press 2021. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

2021. Disagreement and Epistemic Improvement. (with Fernando Broncano-Berrocal). Synthese, Special Issue 'Social Epistemology,' eds. A. Carter and C. Kelp. 199:14641–14665.

2021. Knowledge and Reasoning. Synthese, Special Issue 'Knowledge and Decision', eds. R. Heil, J. Koscholke, P. Rich, M. Schultz, 199: 10371–10388.

2021. What's the Point of Authors? (with Habgood-Coote J. et al.)The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75 (2), 487-517

2021. Blame as Performance. Synthese, 199: 7595–7614.

2021. Testimonial Contractarianism: A Knowledge-First Social Epistemology. Nous 55/4: 891-916.

Top 10 most downloaded papers in Nous for: 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022

2021. Gender, Race, and Group Disagreement (with M. Miragoli). In Group Disagreement, Carter, A and Broncano-Berrocal, F., Routledge.

2021. Assertion Compatibilism. In Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered, C. Kyriakou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.), Routledge.

2021. Scepticism about Epistemic Dilemmas. Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (eds. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup), Routledge.

2021. Introduction (with J. Brown). Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2021. Review of Juan Comesana, Being Rational and Being Right, Oxford University Press 2020. Mind. 131/523: 1007–1017.

2020. A Priori Perceptual Entitlement, Knowledge-First. Philosophical Issues. Eds. M. McGrath and S. Schellenberg.2020. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with Chris Kelp). Synthese 197: 125–137.

2020. Conceptual Innovation, Function First (with Chris Kelp). Nous. 54/4: 985-1002.

2020. Editorial (with Robert Cowan). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Special Issue 'Ethics, Knowledge, and Language' Vol 23/1: 1-3.

2020. Hoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa (with Cameron Boult, Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, Paul Dimmock, Harmen Ghijsen and Chris Kelp). Synthese. 197: 5187–5202.

2020. The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust. (with A. Carter). Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

2020. Social Epistemology of Education. Encyclopaedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy. Springer: Netherlands.

2020. Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content (with C. Boult, C. Kelp and J. Schnurr). In Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.

2020. Review of Sandy Goldberg, Conversational Pressure, Oxford University Press 2020. Philosophical Quarterly, 71/4.

2020. Review of Kate Manne, Down Girl, Oxford University Press 2017. Philosophical Quarterly, 71/3: 681–684.

2019. Knowledge-First Functionalism. Philosophical Issues. Ed: Lisa Miracchi. Online First.

2019. Epistemic Norms, Closure and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology (with Johanna Schnurr an Emma Gordon). Synthese. Online First

2019. Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief-Assertion Parallel. Analysis, Volume 79, Issue 2.

2019. Saying and Believing: The Norm Commonality Assumption. Philosophical Studies Volume 176, Issue 8: 1951–1966.

2019. Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms. Inquiry. Online First.

2019. Assertion: The Context Shiftiness Dilemma. Mind & Language. 34: 503–517

2019. Hermeneutical Injustice as Basing Failure. In Bondy, P. and Carter, J.A. (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, Routledge.

2018. The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21(3), pp. 477-488

2018. How to Be an Anti-Reductionist (with Chris Kelp). Synthese. Online First

2018. No Epistemic Norm for Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 55(3): 231-238

2018. A Puzzle for Epistemic WAMs. Synthese. Online First.

2018. Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’. Logos and Episteme, vol. 9(1): 91-98.

2018. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with Chris Kelp). Synthese. Online First.

2018. Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View (with C. Kelp). In Goldberg, S. (ed), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.

2017. The ‘Should’ in Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry, Vol. 61/8.

2017. Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion (with Chris Kelp). Journal of Philosophy, 114(2): 76-93.

2017. Commodious Knowledge (with Chris Kelp). Synthese, vol 194(5): 1487-1502.

2017. Epistemic Norms and He Said/She Said Reporting. Episteme, 14(4): 413-422.

2016. Assertion: Knowledge is Enough. Synthese, 193(10): 3041-3056.

2016. Norms of Belief (with Chris Kelp and Harmen Ghijsen). Philosophical Issues, eds. Chris Kelp and Jack Lyons, vol. 26(1): 375-392.

2016. The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge (with Chris Kelp). American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53(4): 397-411.

2016. Perception, History and Benefit. Episteme, 13(1): 61-76.

2016. Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Rawlsian Veil. Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3): 557-572.

2016. Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back. Logos & Episteme, vol. 7(3): 385-391. Reply from Jon Kvanvig here.

2016. Knowledge, Rational Credibility, and Assertion: The Scoreboard. In Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Goals, DeGruyter Berlin/Boston.

2014. Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce's Style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11(2): 107-121.