PUBLICATIONS
AoS: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Moral & Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Gender and Race, Philosophy of AI
AoC: Philosophical Methodology, Social Ontology, Philosophy of Science, Applied Ethics, Media and Communication
Theory.
BOOKS
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In Progress. Resistance to Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
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2021. Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press (with Chris Kelp).
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2021. Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press.
See here for an interview with me about the book by Carrie Figdor
for the New Books in Philosophy podcast:
See here for Philosopher Meets Critics session at Concept Cologne:
(with Peter J. Graham, Robin McKenna, and Nuno Venturinha)
EDITED VOLUMES
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2021. Reasons, Justification, and Defeat (with Jessica Brown, eds.). Oxford University Press.
JOURNAL SPECIAL ISSUES
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Forthcoming. Synthese Special Issue: Knowledge First Epistemology (with C. Kelp, eds.).
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2022. Philosophical Studies Book Symposium on Jessica Brown's 'Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge' (with A. Carter and C. Kelp).
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2021. Philosophical Topics Special Issue: Epistemology (with A. Carter, C. Kelp, and J. Lyons, eds.)
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2020. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice BSET Special Issue: 'Ethics, Knowledge, and Language,' Vol 23/1 (with R. Cowan, eds.) Online here.
JOURNAL ARTICLES
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Forthcoming. What is Trustworthiness? (with C. Kelp). Nous.
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Forthcoming. Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2021
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Forthcoming. Knowledge and Disinformation. Episteme, Special Issue.
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Forthcoming. Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (with C. Kelp). Asian Journal of Philosophy, central piece in an invited article symposium, ed. N. Pedersen, critics: J Adam Carter, Fei Song, Shane Ryan.
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2022. The Epistemic Normativity of Conjecture. Philosophical Studies 179: 3447–3471.
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2022. How to Be an Infallibilist (with C. Kelp and J.A. Carter). Philosophical Studies 179(8): 2675-2682.
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2021. Disagreement and Epistemic Improvement. (with F. Broncano-Berrocal). Synthese. 199:14641–14665.
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2021. Knowledge and Reasoning. Synthese. 199: 10371–10388
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2021. Blame as Performance. Synthese 199: 7595–7614.
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2021. Testimonial Contractarianism: A Knowledge-First Social Epistemology. Nous 55/4: 891-916.
Top 10 most downloaded papers in Nous (for 2019 and 2020).
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2020. A Priori Perceptual Entitlement, Knowledge-First. Philosophical Issues. Eds. M. McGrath and S. Schellenberg.
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2020. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with C. Kelp). Synthese 197: 125–137.
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2020. Conceptual Innovation, Function First (with C. Kelp). Nous. 54/4: 985-1002.
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2020. Editorial (with R. Cowan). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Special Issue 'Ethics, Knowledge, and Language' Vol 23/1: 1-3.
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2020. Hoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa (with C. Boult, F. Broncano-Berrocal, P. Dimmock, H. Ghijsen and C. Kelp). Synthese. 197: 5187–5202.
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2019. Knowledge-First Functionalism. Philosophical Issues. Ed: Lisa Miracchi. Online First.
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2019. Epistemic Norms, Closure and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology (with J. Schnurr an E. Gordon). Synthese. Online First
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2019. Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief-Assertion Parallel. Analysis, Volume 79, Issue 2.
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2019. Saying and Believing: The Norm Commonality Assumption. Philosophical Studies Volume 176, Issue 8: 1951–1966.
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2019. Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms. Inquiry. Online First.
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2019. Assertion: The Context Shiftiness Dilemma. Mind & Language. 34: 503–517
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2018. The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21(3), pp. 477-488
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2018. How to Be an Anti-Reductionist (with C. Kelp). Synthese. Online First
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2018. No Epistemic Norm for Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 55(3): 231-238
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2018. A Puzzle for Epistemic WAMs. Synthese. Online First.
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2018. Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’. Logos and Episteme, vol. 9(1): 91-98.
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2018. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with C, Kelp). Synthese. Online First.
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2017. The ‘Should’ in Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry, Vol. 61/8.
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2017. Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion (with C. Kelp). Journal of Philosophy, 114(2): 76-93.
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2017. Commodious Knowledge (with C. Kelp). Synthese, vol 194(5): 1487-1502.
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2017. Epistemic Norms and He Said/She Said Reporting. Episteme, 14(4): 413-422.
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2016. Assertion: Knowledge is Enough. Synthese, 193(10): 3041-3056.
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2016. Norms of Belief (with C. Kelp and H. Ghijsen). Philosophical Issues, eds. C. Kelp and J. Lyons, vol. 26(1): 375-392.
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2016. The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge (with C. Kelp). American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53(4): 397-411.
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2016. Perception, History and Benefit. Episteme, 13(1): 61-76.
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2016. Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Rawlsian Veil. Journal of Value Inquiry, 50(3): 557-572.
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2016. Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back. Logos & Episteme, vol. 7(3): 385-391. Reply from Jon Kvanvig here.
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2014. Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce's Style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11(2): 107-121.
BOOK CHAPTERS
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Forthcoming. Knowledge Comes First. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (eds. B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa), Wiley-Blackwell.
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Forthcoming. Knowledge Still Comes First. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (eds. B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa), Wiley-Blackwell.
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Forthcoming. Defeat. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, ed. Kurt Sylvan, Wiley-Blackwell.
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Forthcoming. Epistemology. The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy (ed. M. Rossberg).
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Forthcoming. Talking to Social Robots, Trusting Diagnostic AI: Explainability vs. Trustworthiness. Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives, (Cappelen, H. and Sterken, R), Oxford University Press.
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Forthcoming. Two Dilemmas for Value-Sensitive Technological Design. In Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies, Eds. Edwards, M. and Palermos, O., Routledge.
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Forthcoming. Engineering Evidence. New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering (eds. M.G. Isaac and K. Scharp), Springer.
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Forthcoming. A Social Epistemology of Assertion (with C. Kelp). Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, Lackey J. and McGlynn A. (Eds.). Oxford University Press.
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Forthcoming. Conceptual Engineering. Carnap Handbuch, ed. Christian Damböck and Georg Schiemer, Metzler Verlag.
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Forthcoming. Knowledge and Disagreement (with F. Broncano-Berrocal). Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, (M. Baghramian, A. Carder, and R. Rowland eds.), Routledge.
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2021. Assertion Compatibilism. In Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered, C. Kyriakou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.), Routledge. pdf
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2021. Scepticism about Epistemic Dilemmas. Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (eds. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup), Routledge.
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Forthcoming. On Behalf of Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology (with A. Carter and C. Kelp). Doxastic and Propositional Warrant, Paul Silva and Luis Oliveira (eds.), London: Routledge. pdf
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Forthcoming. Closure, Warrant Transmission, and Defeat. In Epistemic Closure and Transmission, Eds.: Jope M. and Pritchard, D. Routledge.
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2021. Gender, Race, and Group Disagreement (with M. Miragoli). In Group Disagreement, Carter, A and Broncano-Berrocal, F., Routledge.
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2021. Introduction (with J. Brown). Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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2020. The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust. (with A. Carter). Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
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2020. Social Epistemology of Education. Encyclopaedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy. Springer: Netherlands.
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2020. Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content (with C. Boult, C. Kelp and J. Schnurr). In Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
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2019. Hermeneutical Injustice as Basing Failure. In Bondy, P. and Carter, J.A. (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, Routledge.
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2018. Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View (with C. Kelp). In Goldberg, S. (ed), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
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2016. Knowledge, Rational Credibility, and Assertion: The Scoreboard. In Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Goals, DeGruyter Berlin/Boston.
BOOK REVIEWS & SYMPOSIA CONTRIBUTIONS
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Forthcoming. Review of Jennifer Lackey, The Epistemology of Groups, Oxford University Press 2021. Philosophical Review.
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Forthcoming. Sosa on Permissible Suspension. Contribution to Book Symposium on Ernest Sosa's 'Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of TElic Normativity', Res Philosophica.
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Forthcoming. Tanesini on Truth and Epistemic Vice. Contribution to Book Symposium on Alessandra Tanesini's 'The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology', Inquiry.
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2022. Review of Sven Rosenkranz. Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford University Press 2021. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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2021. Review of Juan Comesana, Being Rational and Being Right, Oxford University Press 2020. Mind. Online First.
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2020. Review of Sandy Goldberg, Conversational Pressure, Oxford University Press 2020. Philosophical Quarterly. Online First.
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2020. Review of Kate Manne, Down Girl, Oxford University Press 2017. Philosophical Quarterly. Online First.